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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past several years, the State Bar of Georgia has lobbied vigorously for the adoption of a new Georgia Evidence Code based upon the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Few would dispute that the existing Georgia
Evidence Code, which really is not a code at all but rather an amorphous
amalgam of disjointed statutes and thousands of judicial decisions, is in
need of revision. Apparently, however, there is considerable dispute regarding exactly what changes should be made.
The proposed Georgia Rules of Evidence is the product of an intensive
study by the State Bar of the deficiencies of the existing code and possible changes. The proposed rules were first introduced in the General Assembly in 1989 and, in 1990, were approved by the Senate but not by the
House. The proposed rules were reintroduced in the 1991 session and
again received the approval of the Senate but languished in the House
Judiciary Committee for the remainder of the session. The proposed rules
carried over to the 1992 session but were never reported out of the Judiciary Committee. According to Bar officials, it is uncertain whether the proposed rules will be introduced in the 1993 session.
II.

RULE

404:

CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES

Rule 4041 is the principal rule addressing the admissibility of "extrinsic
act evidence" or evidence of acts and transactions other than the one at
issue. Rule 404 has probably figured in more Eleventh Circuit appeals
than any other single rule of evidence, and previous surveys by the author
have addressed extrinsic act evidence issues in some detail. Although the
* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
College (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1981). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. FED. R. EvD. 404.
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present survey year seemed to be an off year for extrinsic act evidence
appeals, extrinsic act evidence cases, like bad pennies, always turn up.
Accordingly, a brief discussion of the Federal Rules approach to extrinsic
act evidence analysis is appropriate.
The starting point of extrinsic act evidence analysis is a determination
of whether the evidence is being offered for a substantive purpose or to
impeach or bolster a witness. If the latter, then the admissibility of the
evidence is determined by the rules found in Article 6, principally rule
608,2 which addresses the use of character evidence and evidence of specific instances of conduct. If, however, the extrinsic act evidence is offered
for a substantive purpose, then its admissibility is governed by the rules
found in Article 4, principally rule 404(b).
The distinction between substantive and impeachment evidence is
demonstrated by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Farmer.4 In Farmer defendant contended that the district court improperly limited his cross-examination of a prosecution witness about an extrinsic act, arguing that evidence of this act demonstrated a motive on the
part of the witness to testify falsely. Relying on rule 404(b)'s provision
that extrinsic act evidence may be admissible to prove motive, defendant
argued that he should have been allowed to examine the witness about
the extrinsic act. The Eleventh Circuit easily deflected this argument,
noting that the word "motive" as used in rule 404(b) refers to the motive
for the commission of the charged offense and does not refer to a motive
to testify falsely.5 If extrinsic act evidence is being offered to attack a
witness's credibility, the Eleventh Circuit continued, then rule 608(b)
governs the admissibility of the evidence.'
Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of extrinsic act evidence to prove a
person's propensity to act in a particular way.7 However, extrinsic act evidence "may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake
or accident."
To determine whether extrinsic act evidence is admissible under rule
404, the Eleventh Circuit uses the test established by the old Fifth Circuit in United States v. Beechum. "First, it must be determined that
the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an issue other than the de2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

FED. R. EviD. 608.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
923 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1567.
Id.
FED. R, EvID. 404(b).
Id.
582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
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fendant's character. Second, the evidence must possess probative value
that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and must
meet the other requirements of [riule 403. " 1
This general rule, so easily stated, can be exceedingly difficult to apply,
as demonstrated by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Pollock." In Pollock defendant contended that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his prior conviction for conspiracy to import
marijuana, arguing that this evidence was not relevant to any legitimate
issue but rather tended only to prove his propensity to commit drug
crimes. The government responded that this evidence was relevant to
prove defendant's intent to commit the charged offense."' The Eleventh
Circuit, while acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing between
"propensity" and "intent" ("what appears to one person as propensity
8
may be intent to another; the margin between is not a bright line"),'
held that evidence of an extrinsic offense is admissible to prove intent if
the extrinsic offense requires the same intent as the charged offense."'
While it may tend to prove propensity, it nevertheless is also relevant to
the legitimate issue of intent and therefore is admissible.' 5
The Eleventh Circuit in Pollock also noted, and this no doubt seems
perverse to criminal defendants, that the more difficult it is for the government to prove a defendant's intent, the more likely it is that extrinsic
act evidence will be admissible."8 For example, the court continued, it is
often extremely difficult to prove intent in conspiracy cases and, because
of this difficulty, the government's need for additional evidence is
greater.1 ' In this situation, the extrinsic act evidence is more likely admissible. If, however, the government has independent evidence to establish
intent and can obtain a conviction without evidence of the extrinsic offense, then that evidence should not be admitted." In other words, the
weaker the government's case, the more likely it will be allowed patent
extrinsic act evidence. The Eleventh Circuit conceded that this is a
"heads I win; tails you lose" proposition for a defendant."
Frequently, defendants anxious to thwart the admission of extrinsic act
evidence will offer to stipulate to a particular fact or element of an offense and then argue that the extrinsic act evidence should not be admit10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

582 F.2d at 911 (citations omitted).
926 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 593 (1991).
926 F.2d at 1047-48.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id. at 1048-49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1049.
Id.
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ted because it is unnecessary. During the current survey period, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that such a stipulation does not necessarily
preclude the admission of extrinsic act evidence.2 0 The Eleventh Circuit
also reaffirmed that a plea of not guilty always places the element of intent at issue. 2' Therefore, extrinsic act evidence is admissible to prove
intent unless defendant
"affirmatively withdraws the element of intent
22
from the case.1
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Eason"' is notable
for its scathing condemnation of the Office of the United States Attorney
for the Southern District of Georgia for a blatantly improper use of extrinsic act evidence. In Eason the government, while cross-examining a
witness, illicited testimony that defendant's father had been convicted of
charges similar to those against defendant. This testimony greatly
strengthened the case against defendant. The government argued that it
did not adduce this testimony as substantive evidence of defendant's
guilt, but rather to impeach the witness's testimony, an assertion that the
Eleventh Circuit simply did not believe.2 ' Moreover, even if the government did intend to impeach the witness, there is no basis for impeaching
a witness with someone else's conviction.2 1 In short, a conviction of a codefendant or a co-conspirator is not admissible for substantive purposes
because it is not relevant to a legitimate issue. While a witness may be
impeached by his own conviction,
he certainly cannot be impeached by
2
the conviction of someone else.
Finally, the Supreme Court amended rule 404(b) during the survey period to provide that the government must give notice to an accused if he
intends to introduce extrinsic act evidence.2 7 However, this notice need
only be given if requested by defendant.2
III. RULE 405: METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
As discussed above, rule 404(b) broadly but not totally prohibits the,
use of character evidence for substantive purposes.2 In the limited situations in which evidence of character is admissible for substantive pur20. United States v. Huppert, 917 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990).
21. United States v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 1991).
22. Id, at 925 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 522 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 159 (1990)).
23. 920 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1990).
24. Id. at 734-35.
25. Id. at 735.
26. Id.
27. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
28. Id.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 1-28.
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poses, rule 405 provides the methods for proving character. 30 Again, one
must be careful to distinguish rules 404 and 405, which govern the use of
extrinsic act evidence for substantive purposes, from rule 608, which governs the use of extrinsic act evidence for impeachment purposes.
Although rule 405 concerns only the methods of proving character and
does not expressly address the admissibility of character evidence, 3' the
district court in United States v. Camejo3 2 relied on rule 405 to hold that
evidence of a prior act of good conduct was "irrelevant." In Camejo the
district court refused to admit evidence that defendant had refused an
offer to engage in a drug transaction similar to the one with which he was
charged. On appeal, defendant argued that evidence of this refusal was
relevant to show his lack of mens rea to commit the charged offense. 3
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court s' but did not rely upon
rule 405, which clearly has nothing to do with "relevancy". Rather, the
Eleventh Circuit cited the well established principle that evidence of good
conduct is not admissible to negate criminal intent." Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected defendant's assertion that the evidence was offered to
prove lack of criminal intent and concluded that defendant simply
wanted to demonstrate his good character through evidence of prior good
acts. s s

IV. RULE 407: SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
Rule 407 embodies one of the best known principles of evidence: Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence.3 7 However, rule 407 by itself does not prohibit the admission of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered for any other
purpose, including impeachment.3 8 In Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise
30. FED. R, EvID. 405.
31. See FED. R, EvID. 405 advisory committee's note.
32. 929 F.2d 610 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Setien v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
228 (1991).
33. 929 F.2d at 613.
34. Id. at 612.
35. Id. at 613.
36. Id.
37. FED. R. EVID. 407.
38. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note. The emphasis of "any" is to distinguish the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Andres v. Roswell-Windsor Village Apartments, 777
F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir. 1985), which purportedly holds that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is "admissible when offered for certain admissible uses" and that the illustrative permissible purposes expressly mentioned rules 407 and the advisory committee's notes
are the only permissible uses. Fortunately, Andres, which was criticized in rather impolitic
language in this author's first Eleventh Circuit survey, has not been cited for this proposition. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 38 MERCER L. REV. 1253, 1261-62 (1987). Although
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Lines, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a defendant opened the door to the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. In Wilkinson plaintiff sought to recover damages for
injuries incurred when a sliding door on defendant's cruise ship malfunctioned. After the injury, defendant locked the door in the open position.
The district court initially ruled that rule 407 barred the admission of
evidence of this remedial measure. However, an employee of defendant
subsequently testified that he examined the door on the day of the incident and found it to be in normal operating condition. He also testified
that he was not aware of any accidents either prior or subsequent to
plaintiff's injury. Finally, he opined that the door had been properly
maintained. Because of this testimony, the district court permitted plaintiff to establish that the door had been locked in the olden position to
rebut what it considered'to be defendant's employee's testimony that
''everything was fine and normal with the doors both before and after the
40
accident.'
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted this evidence for impeachment purposes.4 1 Although the
Eleventh Circuit conceded that rule 407 specifically permits the use of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures to impeach a witness, it noted
that the impeachment exception is narrowly interpreted because this exception can be used as a subterfuge to prove negligence. Closely examining the testimony, the court found the fact that the door had been left
open impeached nothing in the testimony of defendant's employee." The
court specifically rejected the district court's conclusion that the employee's testimony suggested that the doors operated normally after the
accident. 43 It can be argued that the Eleventh Circuit's stringent analysis
is inconsistent with the abuse of discretion standard. Nevertheless, if the
employee's testimony did, not suggest that the door was in proper operating condition after the accident, then its conclusion is undoubtedly
correct.

the Eleventh Circuit cited Andres in Wil kinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d
1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1991), its discussion does not indicate approval of this particular portion of Andres.
39. 920 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1991).
40. Id. at 1568 n.15.
41. Id. at 1567.
42.

Id. at 1568.

43. Id. at 1568 n.15.
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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 412: RAPE CASES; RELEVANCE OF
VICTIM'S PAST BEHAVIOR

The Federal Rules of Evidence's version of what are commonly known
as rape shield statutes is found in rule 412." Because rule 412 applies
only to federal rape charges, it is rare that the Eleventh Circuit is required to apply rule 412, and this year was no exception. However, in
Michigan v. Lucas,45 the United States Supreme Court addressed a constitutional issue raised by a state rape shield statute's limitation on the
admissibility of evidence of prior sexual activity by the alleged victim.
This decision merits discussion. In Lucas defendant challenged the Michigan statute's notice requirement, which barred the admission of evidence
of prior sexual activity between a victim and a defendant unless the defendant gave appropriate notice within ten days after his arraignment.
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that any notice requirement violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The United
States Supreme Court rejected this flat prohibition against notice requirements and remanded to the state court for a determination of whether
the legitimate interests served by the notice requirement
outweighed the
4
limitation of defendant's constitutional rights. "
VI.

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501. PRIVILEGES

The Federal Rules of Evidence, rather than undertaking the daunting
task of formulating rules recognizing and defining various evidentiary
privileges, yields to the courts and allows the federal judiciary to formulate rules governing evidentiary privileges except in diversity cases in
which state law determines the existence of a privilege. 7 It is arguable
that the "crime-fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege presents
a strong case for the proposition that the Federal Rules of Evidence
should undertake to provide specific rules of privilege. Perhaps because
appellate review of cases involving the attorney-client privilege often take
place in the vacuum created by in-camera inspections, it seems that the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is in a near hopeless
state'of confusion. However, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in In Re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 89-10,4" may bring some clarity to at least
one aspect of the crime-fraud exception. In Grand Jury Proceedings 8910, the government sought the production of memoranda containing com44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

FED. R. EviD. 412.
111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991).
Id. at 1748.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
938 F.2d 1578 (11th Cir. 1991).
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munications between appellant and his attorneys. The government, relying on the crime-fraud exception, argued that these memoranda were not
privileged." The criminal or fraudulent activity at issue clearly ceased

prior to the creation of the memoranda. Nevertheless, the district court
ordered the production of the memoranda after concluding that they
"merely memorialize[d]" communications that occurred during the alleged crime or fraud." On appeal, the government argued that because
the actual communications would be within the crime-fraud exception,
the memorialization of the communications is also subject to disclosure.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed."s
The Eleventh Circuit looked not to the information communicated, but
to the communications themselves. "In other words, it is generally the
context, rather than the content, of a communication that allows invocation of the attorney-client privilege."" Thus, although the information
found in the memoranda may not have been privileged at one point (if
made to further a crime or fraud), this information may become privileged when it is the subject of a subsequent communication. After reviewing the documents in-camera, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
parties intended the memoranda to be confidential and that the memoranda met all the criteria of the attorney-client privilege." Because they
were not created during or before the commission of the alleged crime or
fraud, the crime-fraud exception did not apply." On a practical note, the
Eleventh Circuit added that the government's "mere memorialization"
argument would effectively make it impossible for a client who has once
engaged in a communication (which would be within the crime-fraud exception) to ever discuss with counsel the crime or fraud involved. 5'
Generally speaking, the identity, of a client is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. However, the "last link" exception to this general
principle can protect a client's identity from disclosure. Unfortunately,
the last link exception has spawned only slightly less confusion than the
crime-fraud exception. Last year's survey addressed in some detail the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin). 6
49. The crime-fraud exception strips communications of the protection of the attorneyclient privilege if the client obtained the attorney's assistance to further present or future
criminal or fraudulent activity. However, the crime-fraud exception does not permit the
discovery of communications concerning past or completed crimes or frauds.
50. 938 F.2d at 1581.
51. Id. at 1582.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 896 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1990). See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L, REV.
1451, 1462-64 (1991).
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Rabin, which included a concurring opinion by Judge Tjofiat in which he
argued that the last link exception should be abolished completely,
seemed to narrow the scope of the last link exception. Specifically, the
court in Rabin held that a client's identity is protected from disclosure
only if disclosure would reveal other privileged information. 7 The Eleventh Circuit specifically and emphatically rejected the notion that a client's identity can be privileged simply because disclosure of the client's
name could incriminate the client.55
During the present survey period, the Eleventh Circuit revisited the
last link exception in In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (GJ9O-2).s ' The
author, who does not practice criminal law, will leave it to lawyers who do
to decide whether Rabin and GJ9O-2 can be reconciled. In GJ9O-2 the
client sought legal advice from an attorney concerning drug charges pending against the client's friend. The client was concerned that he also
might be criminally responsible for the drug transaction that gave rise to
the charges against his friend. In addition, the client wanted to know
whether he would be implicated in the drug transaction if he assisted his
friend in obtaining legal representation. The attorney declined to represent the client but, when subsequently subpoenaed by a grand jury,
the attorney nevertheless refused to reveal the client's name. The district
court ordered the attorney to reveal the client's identity and, when he
refused, found him in contempt of court. The district court reasoned that
the last link exception did not justify the attorney's refusal to testify because the client's motive for seeking legal advice was already known.
Therefore, the disclosure of the name would not reveal other privileged
information.00 Although this reasoning seems consistent with Rabin, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that this reasoning was "inconsistent with binding precedent".1 However, In Re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Jones)" was the only binding precedent cited by the court"s and, in Rabin, the Eleventh Circuit went to great lengths to emphasize that Jones
protects a client's identity only when disclosure of the identity would reveal other privileged information." Nevertheless, in GJ90-2 the Eleventh
Circuit rejected as "disingenuous" the government's argument that revelation of the client's identity would not disclose privileged information
57.

896 F.2d at 1273.

58. Id. at 1273-74.
59. 946 F.2d 746 (11th Cir. 1991).
60. Id. at 747-48.
61. Id. at 748.
62. 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
63. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
prior to October 1, 1981.
64. 896 F.2d 1267, 1271-73 (11th Cir. 1990).
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because it already knew the client's incriminating motive for seeking legal
advice." Judge Tjoflat, in his Rabin concurrence, urged the Eleventh Circuit to sit en banc and "take a careful and critical look at [the] ill-conceived [last link] doctrine.""' This may be the only way that lawyers
practicing criminal law can obtain a clear statement of the parameters of
the last link exception.

VII. RULE 602:

LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

The principle that lay witnesses may only testify to facts of which they
have personal knowledge is, more than any other single rule of evidence,
the foundation of the common law's evidentiary scheme. In the Federal
Rules of Evidence, this principle is found in rule 602.67 Typically, the application of rule 602 is clear; either a witness hhs personal knowledge of a
fact (for example, he saw the collision) or he does not.
In United States v; Van Dorn,65 however, the Eleventh Circuit faced a
more difficult determination of whether rule 602 barred the admission of
testimony. In Van Dorn a government witness testified that defendant.
was a member of an organized crime family. Defendants contended that
the district court improperly admitted this testimony because the witness
did not have first hand knowledge of any facts supporting this testimony. 9 The Eleventh Circuit, however, disagreed. 70 The Eleventh Circuit
reviewed numerous discrete facts testified to by the witness which supported his statement that the defendant was a member of the organized
crime family.7 1 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this evidence demonstrated sufficient connection between defendant and the crime family to
support; the district court's conclusion that the witness had sufficient
knowledge to permit him to testify."2
It would be easy to nitpick the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion. One can
argue that no single fact cited by the witness constituted personal firsthand knowledge that the defendant was a member of the organized crime
family. However, such a technical analysis ignores the reality of the situation. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion simply seems to recognize that one
can be so pervasively involved in an enterprise that he clearly has suffi65. 946 F.2d at 748.
66. 896 F.2d at 1283 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
67. FED. R. EVID. 602.
68. 925 F.2d 1331 (11th Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 1337.

70. Id. at 1338.
71.
72.

Id. at 1337-38.
Id. at 1338.
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cient knowledge to testify to a matter even though no single fact upon
which his testimony is based constitutes "firsthand knowledge."

VIII:

RULE

606: COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS

Rule 606(b) deems a juror incompetent to testify as to the validity of a
verdict except with regard to extraneous prejudicial information or influence injected into the jury's deliberation." Last year's survey discussed
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Cuthel,7 in which the
court held that defendant had not shown a sufficient basis for the district
court to inquire into the validity of a verdict by examining the jurors.76
During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit, in a companion case, addressed the issue of whether rule 606(b) and a local district court rule
prohibiting contact with jurors violated a defendant's First and Sixth
Amendment rights." The Eleventh Circuit held that the state's interests
in ensuring that a defendant is tried by a jury whose deliberations cannot
be publicly exposed outweighed whatever constitutional rights a defendant may have to interview jurors or to require a court to inquire into the
validity of a verdict. 7 The Eleventh Circuit stressed that neither the local
rule nor rule 606(b) categorically prohibited juror contact, but rather
placed reasonable limits upon such contact."

IX. RULE 608: EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS
As discussed above, 79 rule 404(b) governs the admission of extrinsic act
evidence for substantive purposes and rule 608 governs the admissibility
of extrinsic act evidence to impeach a witness. Rule 60880 can be a trap
for the unwary, and careless analysis of extrinsic act evidence offered to
impeach a witness can lead to hopeless confusion. Accordingly, a brief
review of the relevant considerations in analyzing impeachment evidence
is appropriate.
First, rule 608(b) applies to evidence offered to impeach only the general credibility of a witness.' 1 It does not prohibit the admission of extrinsic act evidence to impeach a witness's specific testimony as to a ma73.

FED. R. EVID. 606.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

903 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1990). See Treadwell, supra note 56, at 1465-66.
903 F.2d at 1382-83.
United States v. Griek, 920 F.2d 840 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 843.
Id. at 842-43.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-10.
FED. R. EvIo. 608.

80.
81.

See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 39 MERCER L. REV. 1259, 1274-75 (1988); Marc T.

Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1291, 1306-07 (1989).
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terial fact." Indeed, the limitation of rule 608(b) is narrow and precise. It
prohibits the admission of "extrinsic evidence" of specific instances of
conduct of a witness to impeach or bolster the witness's general credibility.ss However, a party may, by cross-examination (that is, by intrinsic
evidence), inquire into specific instances of conduct if the specific instances of conduct shed light on the witness's character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness, or on the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of another witness as to whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified.8 '
The application of these principles can be demonstrated by a review of
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Ramos.8s In Ramos
defendants, who were arrested after authorities found a large amount of
cocaine, a cache of firearms, drug paraphernalia, and cash in their home
and car, protested that they were the victims of a plot orchestrated by
Miami drug agents and an informant. At trial, defendants attempted to
elicit testimony from a witness concerning his knowledge of a similar plot
concocted by the informant with New York drug agents. The district
court refused to admit the testimony. On appeal, defendants argued that
rule 608(b) did not bar the admission of the evidence because the testimony was offered to contradict a witness's testimony as to a material
fact. 8s However, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the testimony was
not offered to impeach the witness's testimony as to a material fact, but
rather constituted extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of conduct offered for the purpose of attacking the informant's credibility.6s Consequently, rule 608(b) specifically prohibited the admission of this testimony.8s The Eleventh Circuit's opinion does not reveal the substance of
the informant's testimony and thus it is impossible to tell precisely why
the proffered testimony was offered to attack general credibility rather

82.

Id.; see also United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979).

83. Unfortunately, the phrase "extrinsic evidence" as used in rule 608(b) has an entirely
different meaning from the phrase "extrinsic act evidence." The latter refers to evidence of
acts other than the act or incident in question. Both rule 404(b) and rule 606(b) address
permissible use of extrinsic act evidence. Rule 608(b), however, also addresses whether such
acts may be proved by "extrinsic evidence" or whether a party is limited to establishing the
extrinsic act through cross-examination. The prohibition against extrinsic evidence of ex-

trinsic acts is intended to prohibit time consuming forays into ancillary issues. See 10 James
Win. Moore & Helen I. Bendix, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 608.21 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp.
1991).
84. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
85. 933 F.2d 968 (11th Cir. 1991).
86.

1d at 969-75.

87. Id. at 975.
88. Id.
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than to disprove the informant's testimony as to a material fact.8' The
point, however, is that the record demonstrated to the satisfaction of the
Eleventh Circuit that defendants were attempting to attack a witness's
credibility with extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of conduct.
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly rejected the evidence.'
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Costa,"' also provides an excellent example of proper rule 608(b) analysis. In Costa the
district court refused to admit exculpatory testimony offered by defendants. The excluded testimony tended to establish that defendants were
not participants in a series of conspiracies to import cocaine. The district
court concluded that this testimony concerned unrelated conspiracies and
concluded that the evidence would confuse the jury and therefore relied
upon rule 403 to exclude the testimony.'2 The district court also concluded that the evidence was inadmissible under rule 608(b) because the
evidence constituted extrinsic evidence of specific conduct offered for the
purpose of impeaching the character of government witnesses. s The
Eleventh Circuit rejected this conclusion.' 4 Rule 608(b), the Eleventh Circuit explained, only excludes extrinsic evidence offered to impeach the
general credibility of a witness." It does not exclude extrinsic evidence to
"disprove a specific fact material to the defendant's case."'
As discussed above,' 7 the Eleventh Circuit takes a dim view of a prosecutor adducing evidence of a co-defendant or co-conspirator's guilty plea
or conviction. However, there are circumstances when it is proper to allude to such convictions or guilty pleas. In United States v. Hernandez,"
the prosecutor illicited testimony from a government witness that he had
pled guilty to drug conspiracy charges and that his co-conspirators included defendant." The Eleventh Circuit, citing the seminal case of
United States v. King,100 noted that while evidence of guilty pleas and
89. Nor does the opinion address whether the extrinsic act could have been admissible
under rule 404(b) as substantive evidence.
90. 933 F.2d at 975.
91. 947 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1991).
92. The Eleventh Circuit reluctantly affirmed the district court's rule 403 holding after
"giving the district court the 'broadest discretion.'" 947 F.2d at 924. However, the Eleventh
Circuit cautioned that rule 403 should rarely be invoked to exclude exculpatory evidence,
particularly in conspiracy cases. Id.
93. 947 F.2d at 922-23.
94. Id. at 924-25.
95. Id. at 925.
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Calle, 822 F,2d 1016, 1021 (11th Cir. 1987)).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
98. 921 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 227 (1991).
99. 921 F.2d at 1582.
100. 505 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1974).
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convictions of conspirators or co-defendants is generally inadmissible,
such evidence may be admissible for legitimate purposes.' 0 ' For example,
evidence of a witness's guilty plea or conviction may be admissible for the
purpose of rehabilitating or bolstering the witness's credibility if the defense invites the admission of the plea or conviction and the government
does not improperly emphasize the plea or the conviction.1 2 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that defendant invited the testimony by his crossexamination of other prosecution witnesses concerning immunity extended to them. 108 The Court obviously felt that the prosecution elicited
the evidence in anticipation of defendant's cross-examination about the
witness's plea. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit was particularly swayed by
the fact that the government did not emphasize the plea and never referred to it again.' 0 4 While one can question whether it was necessary for
the prosecution to establish that defendant was a co-conspirator in the
conspiracy to which the witness pled guilty, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
overruling defendant's objection.10 5
X.

ARTICLE

VIII;

HEARSAY

A discussion of Eleventh Circuit decisions concerning the admission of
hearsay evidence must necessarily begin with a discussion of the constitutional issues inherent -in
hearsay analysis. By definition, the admission of
hearsay evidence means that a criminal defendant is unable to confront
the witnesses against him. Accordingly, courts frequently must resolve the
question of whether the admission of hearsay evidence violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. The Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue in a case that will have considerable impact on
Georgia criminal trials. In Horton v.Zant, 10" a state trial court allowed a
witness to testify that defendant's co-conspirator told him that defendant
actually "did the shooting.

10 7

Although this statement was made several

days after the alleged crime, the witness's testimony was admissible
under Georgia law because it was made while the conspirators were still
concealing their identity. Defendant, conceding that the statement was
admissible under Georgia's co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule,
101. 921 F.2d at 1582 (citing United States v. King, 505 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1974)).
102. Id.
103.
104.

Id. at 1583.
Id.

105.
106.

Id.
941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1188 (1983).

107. 941 F.2d at 1463. Horton concerned the murder of the Bibb County District Attorney. The Eleventh Circuit's decision received considerable publicity, primarily because of its
principal holding that the prosecution improperly excluded black jurors from the jury.
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nevertheless contended0 that the admission of this testimony violated the
Confrontation Clause.' 6
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the principal
United States Supreme, Court cases addressing this issue. 109 In Ohio v.
Roberts,"0 the Supreme Court held that the admission of hearsay evidence does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights if the statement is marked with sufficient "indicia of reliability" to indicate its trustworthiness."' In Bourjaily v. United States,' s the Supreme Court held
that the trustworthiness requirement of Roberts is satisfied if the hearsay
statement "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."' 3 Coincidentally, the Court in Bourjaily noted that the Georgia co-conspirator exception, which significantly expanded the traditional common law co-conspirator exception, could not be considered a firmly rooted hearsay
exception and thus evidence admitted pursuant to Georgia's co-conspirator exception must be subjected to independent examination to determine whether the evidence had sufficient indicia of reliability to comply
with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause."' In Horton the
Eleventh Circuit found that the evidence in question did not meet this
test . 1 Accordingly, for this and other reasons, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred by not granting defendant's petition
for habeas corpus." 6
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Horton does not mean that evidence
admitted under Georgia's co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is
necessarily constitutionally infirm. Rather, Horton stands for the proposition that Georgia's co-conspirator exception is not so firmly established
that it precludes constitutional attack. Accordingly, trial and appellate
courts now must evaluate evidence admitted under the exception on a
case by case basis to determine whether the dictates of the Confrontation
Clause are satisfied.
So called Bruton violations also frequently present the courts with conflicts between the admission of hearsay evidence and the Confrontation
108.

Id. at 1464.

109. Id.
110. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
111. Id. at 66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)). As discussed in
previous survey articles, Roberts also held that hearsay evidence is not admissible unless the
declarant is unavailable. Id. However, in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that in situations involving the admission of co-conspirator's statements, the prosecution need not show unavailability. See Treadwell, supra note 56, at 1471.
112. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
113. Id. at 183 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
114. Id.
115. 941 F.2d 1449, 1465 (11th Cir. 1991).
116. Id. at 1467.
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Clause. In Bruton v. United States,117 the United States Supreme Court
held that the admission of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession violates the Confrontation Clause." 8 However, the confession may be admitted if it does not directly incriminate a defendant and if the defendant's
name and any reference to the defendant is redacted from the confession.1" In United States v. Vasquez, 12 0 a decision reviewed in a previous
survey,"'1 the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court properly admitted
a statement that had been redacted to replace defendant's name with a
neutral pronoun because the "confession does not compel a direct implication of the complaining defendant."1 2 2 During the present survey period, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Van Hemelryck 1 2 3 again
addressed this issue. In Van Hemelryck, government agents testified to
statements made by a nontestifying co-defendant. Although this testimony did not mention defendant, the statement nevertheless "could reasonably be understood only as referring" to defendant.1 2 4 Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the testimony did not explicitly name defendant, it
nevertheless incriminated him and therefore was inadmissible.1 2 5 However, the court found the admission of the statement to be a harmless
12
error.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that hearsay "is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 1 2 7 Frequently, trial lawyers will argue that evidence of an out-of-court statement should be admitted because it is not being offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in T. Harris
Young & Associates v. Marquette Electronics1 2 8 demonstrates that trial
lawyers sometime takes this argument too far. In T. Harris Young, an
antitrust action, plaintiff sought to prove the extent of defendant's interference with plaintiff's customers through the testimony of plaintiff's employees who had interviewed these customers. The employees testified
that the customers told them that defendant's employees had made disparaging comments about plaintiff's product. Plaintiff argued that the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

391 U.S. 123 (1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1014 (1970).
391 U.S. at 126.
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
874 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990).
See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1357, 1373 (1990).
874 F.2d at 1518.
945 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1502.
Id. at 1503.
Id.

127.

FED. R. EVID. 801(C).

128,

931 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 658 (1991).
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statements by the customers were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Indeed, plaintiff argued, it
expressly denied that the disparaging statements were true.18 ' The Eleventh Circuit rejected this absurd argument.18 0 Clearly, the out-of-court
statements were offered to prove that defendant's employees made the
disparaging comments.1"' Thus, the "matter asserted" was that defendant's employees made the comments to the customers. 8 2 The customers'
out-of-court statements were offered to prove this assertion.888
Therefore,
4
the employees' accounts of these statements were hearsay.
Rule 80113' also provides that certain classes of out-of-court statements
are not hearsay. For example, rule 801(d)(2)(D) provides that an employee's statement "concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship," is not hearsay. 13 In Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,3 7 the Eleventh Circuit took what some would consider a narrow view of this provision. In
Wilkinson plaintiff claimed that she was injured when a sliding glass door
on defendant's cruise ship malfunctioned. To prove defendant had notice
of the malfunctioning door, plaintiff's friend testified that a cabin steward
told her that the ship had experienced prior problems with the door. The
district court admitted this testimony as an admission by a party opponent.' 8' The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.18 ' The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that statements by low level employees could be admitted as admissions, but rejected the district court's conclusion that the statement
was admissible simply because it was made by an employee.140 Although
the Eleventh Circuit recognized that it is not necessary to show that an
employee has "speaking authority" as a prerequisite to the admission of a
statement against an employer, the court nevertheless stated the issue as
whether the cabin steward "was authorized to act for his principal, Carnival, concerning the matter about which he allegedly spoke." 1 Relying
upon an affidavit submitted by defendant to support its motion for summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the cabin steward's
129. 931 F.2d at 826.
130.

Id.

131. Id.
132. Id.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 826-27.

135. FED. R. EvID. 801.
136. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

920 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1563.
Id. at 1562-63.
Id. at 1565.
Id. at 1566-67.
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statement did not concern a matter within the scope of his employment.1 42 Moreover, in response to plaintiff's argument that defendant had
waived any right to appeal on this issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that
plaintiff, as the proffering party, had the burden of laying a foundation
for the admission of the statement."' s Plaintiff, the court continued, "offered not one wit of evidence" to establish this foundation and therefore
rejected plaintiff's argument.14 ' One can wonder whether the trial court,
having agreed with plaintiff's argument that the statement was admissible, would have had much patience with further efforts by plaintiff to lay
the foundation for evidence already ruled admissible.
Statements by co-conspirators are another class of out-of-court statements which, pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(E), are not hearsay.1 45 In previous surveys, the author has speculated that the Supreme Court's relaxation of the test for the admission of co-conspirator statements has been
responsible for a decrease in the number of appeals to the Eleventh Circuit concerning co-conspirator statements. Regardless of whether this
speculation is accurate, the current survey year again saw a decrease in
such appeals. In United States v. Christopher,'"4 however, the Eleventh
Circuit made a salient, if obvious, point: To be admissible as a co-conspir7
ator statement, it must first be established who made the statement."
The Eleventh Circuit also reaffirmed its holding in United States v.
Byrom, 48 discussed in last year's survey,149 that an entire conversation
between a co-conspirator and an informant is admissible even though the
informant does not testify at trial. 5 0 The informant's comments are not
hearsay because they are not offered to prove their truth but rather to'
place the conversation in proper context.151
As discussed above,15 2 in T. Harris Young, the Eleventh Circuit held
that out-of-court statements of customers recounting disparaging comments allegedly made by defendant's employees constituted inadmissible
hearsay.' 58 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected plaintiff's argument that
this evidence was admissible under the business records exception to the
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
FED.

R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
146. 923 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1991).
147. Id. at 1551.
148. 910 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1990).
149. See Treadwell, supra note 56, at 1474-75.
150. 910 F.2d at 734.
151. Id. at 737.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 128-34.
153. T. Harris Young & Assoc. v. Marquette Electronics, Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 826-27 (11th
Cir. 1991).
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hearsay rule. 15' The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the out-of-court
statements could not be considered business records "[b]ecause it was not
the regular course of business for the various out-of-court declarants to
report to" defendant's employees. 1' " This reasoning must be contrasted
with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Baxter Health Care Corp. v.
Healthdyne, Inc.11" In Baxter Health Care, plaintiff alleged that defendant's product was defective and, as a result, plaintiff's products, which
included defendant's product as a component, did not operate properly.
To support its claim, plaintiff admitted, records of customer complaints
about plaintiff's product. The pers6n who compiled these records for
plaintiff testified that she talked to various customers about problems
they experienced with plaintiff's product. This employee testified that
these individuals were the persons responsible for the product, that these
individuals reported these' problems in the regular course of their business, and that these individuals complained in order to document that
they encountered problems. 5 ' The Eleventh'Circuit held that the district
court properly admitted this evidence as plaintiff's business records.15
The business records exception, the court noted, does not require that the
identity of the person with firsthand knowledge of the pertinent entry be
identified.15 ' It is sufficient that the information is obtained pursuant to a
regular "business practice'to obtain the pertinent information from individuals with first-hand knowledge,"' 0 Referring to 7. Harris Young, the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that all' involved in the preparation of the
business records must be acting in the regular course of business. "I The
court distinguished T. Harris Young on the grounds that the out-of-court
declarants there were not acting in the regular course of their business. 62
It would seem that the difference between T. Harris Young and Baxter
Health Care is that in the latter, plaintiff's counsel were astute enough to
elicit testimony that the complaining customers were acting in the regular
course of their respective businesses (although it could be argued that
this itself is hearsay). Perhaps cognizant of the apparent similarity between the excluded evidence in T. Harris Young and the evidence admitted in Baxter Hedith Care, the Eleventh Circuit further noted that the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

FED. R. EviD. 803.
931 F.2d at 828.
944 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1576-77.
Id. at 1576.
Id. at 1577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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circumstances surrounding the Baxter complaints "carried higher indicia
of reliability than the statements in T. Harris Young." 163
Exceptions to the rule against hearsay are found in rules 80314 and
in rule 804 are applicable only if the declarant is
804.1'" The exceptions
"unavailable?'. 66 In United States v. Curbello,"I the Eleventh Circuit
discussed in some detail the unavailability requirement and the extent of
the government's burden to establish unavailability. In Curbello defendant was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States.
However, defendant was arrested in the Bahamas and therefore it was
necessary for the government to prove that the defendant intended to
smuggle the seized cocaine into the United States. The government's only
proof of this element of the offense was the testimony of Bahamian police
officers concerning post arrest statements made by defendant's co-conspirator. Because the statement was made after the co-conspirator's arrest, it was not admissible as a statement of a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. 68 However, the district court admitted the
statement under rule 804(b)(3) as a declaration against interest by an unavailable declarant. On appeal, defendant argued that the government
had not established that the co-conspirator was unavailable. The only evidence that the co-conspirator was not available to testify was a representation by the prosecutor that the co-conspirator was imprisoned in the
Bahamas.""' The Eleventh Circuit referred to rule 804(a), which includes
among its illustrative examples of unavailability a situation in which a
declarant "is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance

. . .

by process or

other reasonable means."17 0 Noting that the government had known for
two weeks prior to trial that defendant would object to the statements,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the government had not demonstrated
that it had been unable to arrange for the co-conspirator to testify at
trial.1 71 There was no evidence of unsuccessful attempts to bring the'coconspirator to trial.172 Nor was there any evidence that the co-conspirator
had refused to testify."7 " Furthermore, the government, the court noted,
could have deposed the co-conspirator or obtained his testimony through
163. Id.
164.

FED. R. EvtD. 803.

165,

FED. R. EViD. 804.

166.
167.

FED. R. EVID. 804(b).
940 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1991).

168. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
169.

940 F.2d at 1504-05.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 1505.
Id.
Id. at 1506.

Id.
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letters rogatory.174 In short, the government simply failed to establish
that the co-conspirator was unavailable and therefore the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his outof-court statements. 7
Rule 804(b)(3), which provides for the admission of statements against
interest, states a special qualification for statements against penal interest that are offered to exculpate an accused.1 71 Under these circumstances, statements tending to subject the declarant to criminal liability
are not admissible "unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement. 1 7 The Eleventh Circuit addressed
this qualification in United States v. Gomez. 176 In Gomez defendant offered evidence of the post arrest statement of a co-conspirator to demonstrate that he was unaware of the illegal purpose of a trip. This statement
was made only in the presence of defendant and his sister. 17' The Eleventh Circuit held that this was insufficient to satisfy the trustworthiness
requirement of rule 804(b)(4). 1 0" Conversely, in United States v. Taggert,1'1 the Eleventh Circuit held that a statement against penal interest
was sufficiently corroborated because it was made to a law enforcement
officer and confirmed by another individual involved in the illegal
enterprise.18
XI. RULE 901:

REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION OF IDENTIFICATION

The Federal Rules of Evidence take a generally liberal, and certainly
practical, view of the requirement that a party authenticate a document
as a prerequisite to its admissibility. 1 83 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in
United States v. Smith184 illustrates this flexible approach. In Smith the
district court admitted various ledger books even though the authors of
these books were not identified.""5 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting
that identification by the author of a document is not necessary; a document may be authenticated by circumstantial evidence or by the docu174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.

179.

Id. at 1536.

Id. at 1505.
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).

Id.
178. 927 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991).
180. Id.
181.
182.
183.
184.
Ct. 253
185.

944 F.2d 837 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 840.
FED. R. EVID. 901.
918 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 151, and cert. denied, 112 S.
(1991).
918 F.2d at 1510.

1194

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

ment's distinctive characteristics.1 " In Smith the color of the ledgers and
notations found in the ledgers were similar to other documents seized
from one of the defendants. Moreover, the ledgers were found at the
scene of the criminal activity or at the homes of some of the defendants. 18 7 This, the Eleventh Circuit held, tended to establish that the author of the ledgers was involved in the criminal activity and this was sufficient authentication for purposes of rule 901."68

186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id.

